Unfair Learning: GenAI Exceptionalism and Copyright Law
This addresses the legal and ethical problem of AI exceptionalism in copyright law for policymakers and legal scholars, highlighting potential inconsistencies in fair use applications.
The paper challenges the argument that generative AI should receive broad fair use exemptions from copyright law for reproducing copyrighted works, contending that such privileges would be legally inconsistent if not extended to humans, potentially undermining copyright payments.
This paper challenges the argument that generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is entitled to broad immunity from copyright law for reproducing copyrighted works without authorization due to a fair use defense. It examines fair use legal arguments and eight distinct substantive arguments, contending that every legal and substantive argument favoring fair use for GenAI applies equally, if not more so, to humans. Therefore, granting GenAI exceptional privileges in this domain is legally and logically inconsistent with withholding broad fair use exemptions from individual humans. It would mean no human would need to pay for virtually any copyright work again. The solution is to take a circumspect view of any fair use claim for mass copyright reproduction by any entity and focus on the first principles of whether permitting such exceptionalism for GenAI promotes science and the arts.