When Truthful Representations Flip Under Deceptive Instructions?
This addresses the problem of LLM safety by identifying feature- and layer-level signatures of deception for detection and mitigation, though it is incremental as it builds on existing analysis methods.
The study investigated how deceptive instructions alter the internal representations of large language models (LLMs) compared to truthful ones, finding that deceptive instructions induce significant representational shifts detectable via linear probes and sparse autoencoders, with changes concentrated in early-to-mid layers.
Large language models (LLMs) tend to follow maliciously crafted instructions to generate deceptive responses, posing safety challenges. How deceptive instructions alter the internal representations of LLM compared to truthful ones remains poorly understood beyond output analysis. To bridge this gap, we investigate when and how these representations ``flip'', such as from truthful to deceptive, under deceptive versus truthful/neutral instructions. Analyzing the internal representations of Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Gemma-2-9B-Instruct on a factual verification task, we find the model's instructed True/False output is predictable via linear probes across all conditions based on the internal representation. Further, we use Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to show that the Deceptive instructions induce significant representational shifts compared to Truthful/Neutral representations (which are similar), concentrated in early-to-mid layers and detectable even on complex datasets. We also identify specific SAE features highly sensitive to deceptive instruction and use targeted visualizations to confirm distinct truthful/deceptive representational subspaces. % Our analysis pinpoints layer-wise and feature-level correlates of instructed dishonesty, offering insights for LLM detection and control. Our findings expose feature- and layer-level signatures of deception, offering new insights for detecting and mitigating instructed dishonesty in LLMs.