Considering a generative mechanism of consciousness from the perspective of inter-level causation
For researchers in consciousness studies and philosophy of mind, this work offers a theoretical framework linking consciousness to causal mechanisms, but it remains speculative and lacks empirical validation.
This paper proposes that consciousness arises from internal causal mechanisms rather than external interventions, introducing a Dual-Laws Model (DLM) with distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels to explain inter-level causation. The study does not provide concrete experimental results or quantitative findings.
Why do some physical systems possess consciousness, while others do not? Is this a question of physics? Or is it a question of the theory of causation? Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes, and in this study we refer to them respectively as the Physical Stance and the Causal Stance. We propose that the generation of consciousness is determined by its internal causal mechanisms in the Causal Stance. To describe a causal model, we will introduce an asymmetric relation between cause and effect into the formulation that is necessary for describing causality, though not physical laws. We argue that the causal conditions for the generation of consciousness are constituted by internal causal mechanisms of the system, rather than by external interventions. To explain such intrinsic causes, this study focuses on inter-level causality. Traditionally, inter-level causality has been considered an emergent phenomenon rather than a mechanism. We devise a method to implement these mechanisms explicitly in a causal model by examining how causes originating at higher levels are transmitted to lower levels within the system. We then propose a Dual-Laws Model (DLM), which features distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels. Finally, we discuss the generation of functional consciousness and its causality based on the DLM. Note that this study does not address the causal efficacy of the phenomenological aspect.