Stuart D. Russell

Adam Gleave, Mohammad Taufeeque, Juan Rocamonde et al. · berkeley

imitation provides open-source implementations of imitation and reward learning algorithms in PyTorch. We include three inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) algorithms, three imitation learning algorithms and a preference comparison algorithm. The implementations have been benchmarked against previous results, and automated tests cover 98% of the code. Moreover, the algorithms are implemented in a modular fashion, making it simple to develop novel algorithms in the framework. Our source code, including documentation and examples, is available at https://github.com/HumanCompatibleAI/imitation

Joar Skalse, Matthew Farrugia-Roberts, Stuart Russell et al.

It is often very challenging to manually design reward functions for complex, real-world tasks. To solve this, one can instead use reward learning to infer a reward function from data. However, there are often multiple reward functions that fit the data equally well, even in the infinite-data limit. This means that the reward function is only partially identifiable. In this work, we formally characterise the partial identifiability of the reward function given several popular reward learning data sources, including expert demonstrations and trajectory comparisons. We also analyse the impact of this partial identifiability for several downstream tasks, such as policy optimisation. We unify our results in a framework for comparing data sources and downstream tasks by their invariances, with implications for the design and selection of data sources for reward learning.

Peter Barnett, Rachel Freedman, Justin Svegliato et al.

Reward learning algorithms utilize human feedback to infer a reward function, which is then used to train an AI system. This human feedback is often a preference comparison, in which the human teacher compares several samples of AI behavior and chooses which they believe best accomplishes the objective. While reward learning typically assumes that all feedback comes from a single teacher, in practice these systems often query multiple teachers to gather sufficient training data. In this paper, we investigate this disparity, and find that algorithmic evaluation of these different sources of feedback facilitates more accurate and efficient reward learning. We formally analyze the value of information (VOI) when reward learning from teachers with varying levels of rationality, and define and evaluate an algorithm that utilizes this VOI to actively select teachers to query for feedback. Surprisingly, we find that it is often more informative to query comparatively irrational teachers. By formalizing this problem and deriving an analytical solution, we hope to facilitate improvement in reward learning approaches to aligning AI behavior with human values.

Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch et al.

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that any locally optimal symmetric strategy profile is also a (global) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that this result is robust to perturbations to the common payoff and to the local optimum. Applied to machine learning, our result provides a global guarantee for any gradient method that finds a local optimum in symmetric strategy space. While this result indicates stability to unilateral deviation, we nevertheless identify broad classes of games where mixed local optima are unstable under joint, asymmetric deviations. We analyze the prevalence of instability by running learning algorithms in a suite of symmetric games, and we conclude by discussing the applicability of our results to multi-agent RL, cooperative inverse RL, and decentralized POMDPs.

Andrew Critch, Stuart Russell

While several recent works have identified societal-scale and extinction-level risks to humanity arising from artificial intelligence, few have attempted an {\em exhaustive taxonomy} of such risks. Many exhaustive taxonomies are possible, and some are useful -- particularly if they reveal new risks or practical approaches to safety. This paper explores a taxonomy based on accountability: whose actions lead to the risk, are the actors unified, and are they deliberate? We also provide stories to illustrate how the various risk types could each play out, including risks arising from unanticipated interactions of many AI systems, as well as risks from deliberate misuse, for which combined technical and policy solutions are indicated.

David X. Wu, Shreyas Kapur, Anant Sahai et al.

Reinforcement learning has become the dominant paradigm for eliciting reasoning and self-correction capabilities in large language models, but its computational expense motivates exploration of alternatives. Inspired by techniques from autonomous driving and robotics, we investigate whether supervised learning with synthetic error injection can induce self-correction abilities in language models. Our approach inserts artificial errors into reasoning chains, masks them, and supervises the model to recognize and correct these mistakes. Despite the intuitive appeal of this method, we find that it fails to significantly improve performance even on simple synthetic tasks across multiple models. Moreover, even when the model catches its own error, it often parrots the original mistake. We find that the distribution shift of synthetic errors to on-policy errors significantly degrades the error-correction capabilities of the fine-tuned model, even with good synthetic coverage of on-policy errors. Our results help explain why on-policy reinforcement learning methods have proven uniquely effective for eliciting self-correction.

Tianyu Guo, Hanlin Zhu, Ruiqi Zhang et al.

``Socrates is human. All humans are mortal. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.'' This form of argument illustrates a typical pattern of two-hop reasoning. Formally, two-hop reasoning refers to the process of inferring a conclusion by making two logical steps, each connecting adjacent concepts, such that the final conclusion depends on the integration of both steps. It is one of the most fundamental components of human reasoning and plays a crucial role in both formal logic and everyday decision-making. Despite recent progress in large language models (LLMs), we surprisingly find that they can fail at solving simple two-hop reasoning problems when distractors are present. We observe on a synthetic dataset that pre-trained LLMs often resort to random guessing among all plausible conclusions. However, after few steps of fine-tuning, models achieve near-perfect accuracy and exhibit strong length generalization. To understand the underlying mechanisms, we train a 3-layer Transformer from scratch on a synthetic two-hop reasoning task and reverse-engineer its internal information flow. We observe a clear progression in the attention logits throughout training. This pictures a sharp phase transition from an initial stage of random guessing to the emergence of a structured sequential query mechanism, where the model first retrieves the preceding and the bridge concepts in the early layers and then uses them to infer the final answer. Finally, we show that these dynamics can be captured by a minimal three-parameter attention-only network.

Yoshua Bengio, Tegan Maharaj, Luke Ong et al. · cmu, mila

Rapidly improving AI capabilities and autonomy hold significant promise of transformation, but are also driving vigorous debate on how to ensure that AI is safe, i.e., trustworthy, reliable, and secure. Building a trusted ecosystem is therefore essential -- it helps people embrace AI with confidence and gives maximal space for innovation while avoiding backlash. The "2025 Singapore Conference on AI (SCAI): International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety" aimed to support research in this space by bringing together AI scientists across geographies to identify and synthesise research priorities in AI safety. This resulting report builds on the International AI Safety Report chaired by Yoshua Bengio and backed by 33 governments. By adopting a defence-in-depth model, this report organises AI safety research domains into three types: challenges with creating trustworthy AI systems (Development), challenges with evaluating their risks (Assessment), and challenges with monitoring and intervening after deployment (Control).

Yixiao Huang, Hanlin Zhu, Tianyu Guo et al.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer et al.

We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Motivated by concerns of AI deception, we study a qualitatively new phenomenon made possible by partial observability: would an AI assistant ever have an incentive to interfere with the human's observations? First, we prove that sometimes an optimal assistant must take observation-interfering actions, even when the human is playing optimally, and even when there are otherwise-equivalent actions available that do not interfere with observations. Though this result seems to contradict the classic theorem from single-agent decision making that the value of information is nonnegative, we resolve this seeming contradiction by developing a notion of interference defined on entire policies. This can be viewed as an extension of the classic result that the value of information is nonnegative into the cooperative multiagent setting. Second, we prove that if the human is simply making decisions based on their immediate outcomes, the assistant might need to interfere with observations as a way to query the human's preferences. We show that this incentive for interference goes away if the human is playing optimally, or if we introduce a communication channel for the human to communicate their preferences to the assistant. Third, we show that if the human acts according to the Boltzmann model of irrationality, this can create an incentive for the assistant to interfere with observations. Finally, we use an experimental model to analyze tradeoffs faced by the AI assistant in practice when considering whether or not to take observation-interfering actions.