David Wu

Anton Bakhtin, David J Wu, Adam Lerer et al.

No-press Diplomacy is a complex strategy game involving both cooperation and competition that has served as a benchmark for multi-agent AI research. While self-play reinforcement learning has resulted in numerous successes in purely adversarial games like chess, Go, and poker, self-play alone is insufficient for achieving optimal performance in domains involving cooperation with humans. We address this shortcoming by first introducing a planning algorithm we call DiL-piKL that regularizes a reward-maximizing policy toward a human imitation-learned policy. We prove that this is a no-regret learning algorithm under a modified utility function. We then show that DiL-piKL can be extended into a self-play reinforcement learning algorithm we call RL-DiL-piKL that provides a model of human play while simultaneously training an agent that responds well to this human model. We used RL-DiL-piKL to train an agent we name Diplodocus. In a 200-game no-press Diplomacy tournament involving 62 human participants spanning skill levels from beginner to expert, two Diplodocus agents both achieved a higher average score than all other participants who played more than two games, and ranked first and third according to an Elo ratings model.

Samuel Sokota, Ryan D'Orazio, Chun Kai Ling et al.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Samuel Sokota, Gabriele Farina, David J. Wu et al.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Hengyuan Hu, David J Wu, Adam Lerer et al.

We consider the problem of making AI agents that collaborate well with humans in partially observable fully cooperative environments given datasets of human behavior. Inspired by piKL, a human-data-regularized search method that improves upon a behavioral cloning policy without diverging far away from it, we develop a three-step algorithm that achieve strong performance in coordinating with real humans in the Hanabi benchmark. We first use a regularized search algorithm and behavioral cloning to produce a better human model that captures diverse skill levels. Then, we integrate the policy regularization idea into reinforcement learning to train a human-like best response to the human model. Finally, we apply regularized search on top of the best response policy at test time to handle out-of-distribution challenges when playing with humans. We evaluate our method in two large scale experiments with humans. First, we show that our method outperforms experts when playing with a group of diverse human players in ad-hoc teams. Second, we show that our method beats a vanilla best response to behavioral cloning baseline by having experts play repeatedly with the two agents.

John Wu, David Wu, Jimeng Sun

Predicting high-dimensional or extreme multilabels, such as in medical coding, requires both accuracy and interpretability. Existing works often rely on local interpretability methods, failing to provide comprehensive explanations of the overall mechanism behind each label prediction within a multilabel set. We propose a mechanistic interpretability module called DIctionary Label Attention (\method) that disentangles uninterpretable dense embeddings into a sparse embedding space, where each nonzero element (a dictionary feature) represents a globally learned medical concept. Through human evaluations, we show that our sparse embeddings are more human understandable than its dense counterparts by at least 50 percent. Our automated dictionary feature identification pipeline, leveraging large language models (LLMs), uncovers thousands of learned medical concepts by examining and summarizing the highest activating tokens for each dictionary feature. We represent the relationships between dictionary features and medical codes through a sparse interpretable matrix, enhancing the mechanistic and global understanding of the model's predictions while maintaining competitive performance and scalability without extensive human annotation.

Athul Paul Jacob, David J. Wu, Gabriele Farina et al.

We consider the task of building strong but human-like policies in multi-agent decision-making problems, given examples of human behavior. Imitation learning is effective at predicting human actions but may not match the strength of expert humans, while self-play learning and search techniques (e.g. AlphaZero) lead to strong performance but may produce policies that are difficult for humans to understand and coordinate with. We show in chess and Go that regularizing search based on the KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy results in higher human prediction accuracy and stronger performance than imitation learning alone. We then introduce a novel regret minimization algorithm that is regularized based on the KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy, and show that using this algorithm for search in no-press Diplomacy yields a policy that matches the human prediction accuracy of imitation learning while being substantially stronger.

David Wu, Yunnan Wu

Self-supervised representation learning is a fundamental problem in computer vision with many useful applications (e.g., image search, instance level recognition, copy detection). In this paper we present a new contrastive self-supervised representation learning algorithm in the context of Copy Detection in the 2021 Image Similarity Challenge hosted by Facebook AI Research. Previous work in contrastive self-supervised learning has identified the importance of being able to optimize representations while ``pushing'' against a large number of negative examples. Representative previous solutions either use large batches enabled by modern distributed training systems or maintain queues or memory banks holding recently evaluated representations while relaxing some consistency properties. We approach this problem from a new angle: We directly learn a query model and a key model jointly and push representations against a very large number (e.g., 1 million) of negative representations in each SGD step. We achieve this by freezing the backbone on one side and by alternating between a Q-optimization step and a K-optimization step. During the competition timeframe, our algorithms achieved a micro-AP score of 0.3401 on the Phase 1 leaderboard, significantly improving over the baseline $μ$AP of 0.1556. On the final Phase 2 leaderboard, our model scored 0.1919, while the baseline scored 0.0526. Continued training yielded further improvement. We conducted an empirical study to compare the proposed approach with a SimCLR style strategy where the negative examples are taken from the batch only. We found that our method ($μ$AP of 0.3403) significantly outperforms this SimCLR-style baseline ($μ$AP of 0.2001).

Anton Bakhtin, David Wu, Adam Lerer et al.

Prior AI successes in complex games have largely focused on settings with at most hundreds of actions at each decision point. In contrast, Diplomacy is a game with more than 10^20 possible actions per turn. Previous attempts to address games with large branching factors, such as Diplomacy, StarCraft, and Dota, used human data to bootstrap the policy or used handcrafted reward shaping. In this paper, we describe an algorithm for action exploration and equilibrium approximation in games with combinatorial action spaces. This algorithm simultaneously performs value iteration while learning a policy proposal network. A double oracle step is used to explore additional actions to add to the policy proposals. At each state, the target state value and policy for the model training are computed via an equilibrium search procedure. Using this algorithm, we train an agent, DORA, completely from scratch for a popular two-player variant of Diplomacy and show that it achieves superhuman performance. Additionally, we extend our methods to full-scale no-press Diplomacy and for the first time train an agent from scratch with no human data. We present evidence that this agent plays a strategy that is incompatible with human-data bootstrapped agents. This presents the first strong evidence of multiple equilibria in Diplomacy and suggests that self play alone may be insufficient for achieving superhuman performance in Diplomacy.

Hengyuan Hu, Adam Lerer, Brandon Cui et al.

The standard problem setting in Dec-POMDPs is self-play, where the goal is to find a set of policies that play optimally together. Policies learned through self-play may adopt arbitrary conventions and implicitly rely on multi-step reasoning based on fragile assumptions about other agents' actions and thus fail when paired with humans or independently trained agents at test time. To address this, we present off-belief learning (OBL). At each timestep OBL agents follow a policy $π_1$ that is optimized assuming past actions were taken by a given, fixed policy ($π_0$), but assuming that future actions will be taken by $π_1$. When $π_0$ is uniform random, OBL converges to an optimal policy that does not rely on inferences based on other agents' behavior (an optimal grounded policy). OBL can be iterated in a hierarchy, where the optimal policy from one level becomes the input to the next, thereby introducing multi-level cognitive reasoning in a controlled manner. Unlike existing approaches, which may converge to any equilibrium policy, OBL converges to a unique policy, making it suitable for zero-shot coordination (ZSC). OBL can be scaled to high-dimensional settings with a fictitious transition mechanism and shows strong performance in both a toy-setting and the benchmark human-AI & ZSC problem Hanabi.

David J. Wu

By introducing several improvements to the AlphaZero process and architecture, we greatly accelerate self-play learning in Go, achieving a 50x reduction in computation over comparable methods. Like AlphaZero and replications such as ELF OpenGo and Leela Zero, our bot KataGo only learns from neural-net-guided Monte Carlo tree search self-play. But whereas AlphaZero required thousands of TPUs over several days and ELF required thousands of GPUs over two weeks, KataGo surpasses ELF's final model after only 19 days on fewer than 30 GPUs. Much of the speedup involves non-domain-specific improvements that might directly transfer to other problems. Further gains from domain-specific techniques reveal the remaining efficiency gap between the best methods and purely general methods such as AlphaZero. Our work is a step towards making learning in state spaces as large as Go possible without large-scale computational resources.