Towards Secure Infrastructure-based Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
This work addresses security vulnerabilities in CACC systems for the vehicular technology community, representing an incremental improvement by focusing on infrastructure-based detection rather than vehicle-to-vehicle methods.
The paper tackled the problem of detecting denial-of-service attacks in Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control platoons by proposing a security strategy that leverages vehicle-to-infrastructure and infrastructure-to-vehicle communication, achieving successful detection at four different levels of attack severity in simulations.
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a pivotal vehicular application that would allow transportation field to achieve its goals of increased traffic throughput and roadway capacity. This application is of paramount interest to the vehicular technology community with a large body of literature dedicated to research within different aspects of CACC, including but not limited to security with CACC. Of all available literature, the overwhelming focus in on CACC utilizing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. In this work, we assert that a qualitative increase in vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) involvement has the potential to add greater value to CACC. In this study, we developed a strategy for detection of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a CACC platoon where the system edge in the vehicular network plays a central role in attack detection. The proposed security strategy is substantiated with a simulation-based evaluation using the ns-3 discrete event network simulator. Empirical evidence obtained through simulation-based results illustrate successful detection of the DoS attack at four different levels of attack severity using this security strategy.