László B. Kish

Laszlo B. Kish

One of the possible representations of three-valued instantaneous noise-based logic is proposed. The third value is an uncertain bit value, which can be useful in artificial intelligence applications. There is a forth value, too, that can represent a non-existing bit (vacuum-state) that is the same (1 numeric value) for all bits, however that is a squeezed state common for all bits. Some logic gates are explored. A ternary Universe has a significant advantage compared to the standard binary one: its amplitude is never zero during any clock period. All the known binary logic gates work for the binary bit values in the same way as earlier therefore the former binary algorithms can be run in the ternary system with no change and without the problems posed by zero values of the Universe.

Christiana Chamon, Shahriar Ferdous, Laszlo B. Kish

This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators at Alice's/Bob's site(s). The case of partial correlations between Alice's/Bob's and Eve's probing noises is explored, that is, Eve's knowledge of Alice's and Bob's noises is limited but not zero. We explore the bilateral situation where Eve has partial knowledge of Alice's and Bob's random number generators. It is shown that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her probing noises and the measured voltage noise in the wire. She can also crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noise voltages and her evaluation of Alice's/Bob's noise voltages. We then explore the unilateral situation in which Eve has partial knowledge of only Alice's random number generator thus only those noises (of Alice and Eve) are correlated. In this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit, but for sufficiently low error probability, she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

Jiaao Song, Laszlo B. Kish

Utilizing a formerly published cold resistor circuitry, a secure key exchange system is conceived and explored. A circuit realization of the system is constructed and simulated. Similarly to the Pao-Lo key exchanger, this system is secure in the steady-state limit but crackable in the transient situations.

Christiana Chamon, Laszlo B. Kish

This paper introduces a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attack is based on the nonlinearity of the noise generators. We explore the effect of total distortion (TD) at the second order (D2), third order (D3), and a combination of the second and third orders (D2,3) on the security of the KLJN scheme. It is demonstrated that a as little as 1% results in a notable power flow along the information channel, which leads to a significant information leak. We also show that decreasing the effective temperature (that is, the wire voltage) and, in this way reducing nonlinearity, results in the KLJN scheme approaching perfect security.

Christiana Chamon, Shahriar Ferdous, Laszlo B. Kish

This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

Mutaz Melhem, Laszlo Kish

This study addresses a new question regarding the security of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme compromised by DC sources at Alice and Bob: What is the impact of these parasitic sources on active attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, or the current injection attack? The surprising answer is that the parasitic DC sources actually increase the security of the system because, in the case of the MITM attack, they make easier to uncover the eavesdropping. In some of the cases Eve can fix this deficiency but then the problem gets reduced to the original MITM attack to which the KLJN scheme is immune, it is already as proven earlier

Mutaz Y. Melhem, Laszlo B. Kish

A new attack against the Kirchhoff Law Johnson Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC voltage sources at both Alices and Bobs ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.

Mutaz Y. Melhem, Laszlo B. Kish

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic dc-voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leak) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.

Laszlo Bela Kish, Claes Goran Granqvist

A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.

Laszlo Bela Kish, Kamran Entesari, Claes-Goran Granqvist et al.

The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions.

Hsien-Pu Chen, Muneer Mohammad, Laszlo B. Kish

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security.

Elias Gonzalez, Laszlo B. Kish

As the utilization of sensor networks continue to increase, the importance of security becomes more profound. Many industries depend on sensor networks for critical tasks, and a malicious entity can potentially cause catastrophic damage. We propose a new key exchange trust evaluation for peer-to-peer sensor networks, where part of the network has unconditionally secure key exchange. For a given sensor, the higher the portion of channels with unconditionally secure key exchange the higher the trust value. We give a brief introduction to unconditionally secured key exchange concepts and mention current trust measures in sensor networks. We demonstrate the new key exchange trust measure on a hypothetical sensor network using both wired and wireless communication channels.

Laszlo Bela Kish, Claes-Goran Granqvist

We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.

Hsien-Pu Chen, Elias Gonzalez, Yessica Saez et al.

The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the Fluctuation-Dissipation-Theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that the unconditional (information theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak.

Elias Gonzalez, Robert S. Balog, Laszlo B. Kish

The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of sophistication of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are information theoretically secure are quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN). However, these concepts require a dedicated connection between hosts in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be impractical and or cost prohibitive. A practical and cost effective method is to have each host share their respective cable(s) with other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key exchange without the need of an additional cable or key exchanger. In this article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and time required in the star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and equation for the number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star network. We then outline other network geometries and trade-off possibilities that seem interesting to explore.

Laszlo B. Kish, Zoltan Gingl, Robert Mingesz et al.

A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.

X. Cao, Y. Saez, G. Pesti et al.

In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper, we address the secure KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key donation solution is performed lane-by-lane by using roadside key provider equipment embedded in the pavement. A method to compute the lifetime of the KLJN key is also given. This key lifetime depends on the car density and gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key for vehicular communication networks.

Laszlo B. Kish

Unconditionally secure physical key distribution schemes are very slow, and it is practically impossible to use a one-time-pad based cipher to guarantee unconditional security for the encryption of data because using the key bits more than once gives out statistical information, for example via the known-plain-text-attack or by utilizing known components of the protocol and language statistics. Here we outline a protocol that reduces this speed problem and allows almost-one-time-pad based communication with an unconditionally secure physical key of finite length. The physical, unconditionally secure key is not used for data encryption but is employed in order to generate and share a new software-based key without any known-plain-text component. The software-only-based key distribution is then changed from computationally secure to unconditionally secure, because the communicated key-exchange data (algorithm parameters, one-way functions of random numbers, etc.) are encrypted in an unconditionally secure way with a one-time-pad. For practical applications, this combined physical/software key distribution based communication looks favorable compared to the software-only and physical-only key distribution based communication whenever the speed of the physical key distribution is much lower than that of the software-based key distribution. A mathematical security proof of this new scheme remains an open problem.

Laszlo B. Kish, Claes-Goran Granqvist, Sergey M. Bezrukov et al.

Neural spikes in the brain form stochastic sequences, i.e., belong to the class of pulse noises. This stochasticity is a counterintuitive feature because extracting information - such as the commonly supposed neural information of mean spike frequency - requires long times for reasonably low error probability. The mystery could be solved by noise-based logic, wherein randomness has an important function and allows large speed enhancements for special-purpose tasks, and the same mechanism is at work for the brain logic version of this concept.

Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes-Goran Granqvist et al.

This paper deals with the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical statistical physical key exchange method and surveys criticism - often stemming from a lack of understanding of its underlying premises or from other errors - and our related responses against these, often unphysical, claims. Some of the attacks are valid, however, an extended KLJN system remains protected against all of them, implying that its unconditional security is not impacted.

Hsien-Pu Chen, Laszlo B. Kish, Claes-Goran Granqvist et al.

We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [arXiv:1402.2709v2], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Principle of Detailed Balance, Boltzmann's Energy Equipartition Theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.

Hsien-Pu Chen, Laszlo B. Kish, Claes-Goran Granqvist et al.

Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA's mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA's cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374 (2010) 2140-2142], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy cable. We also investigate GAA's claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing - using statistics over a few correlation times only - the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10^-8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA's assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the time-derivative nature of GAA's scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.

Y. Saez, X. Cao, L. B. Kish et al.

We review the security requirements for vehicular communication networks and provide a critical assessment of some typical communication security solutions. We also propose a novel unconditionally secure vehicular communication architecture that utilizes the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme.

L. B. Kish, C. G. Granqvist

A simple and general proof is given for the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange system under practical conditions. The unconditional security for ideal circumstances, which is based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is found to prevail even under slightly non-ideal conditions. This security level is guaranteed by the continuity of functions describing classical physical linear, as well as stable non-linear, systems. Even without privacy amplification, Eve's probability for successful bit-guessing is found to converge towards 0.5 - i.e., the perfect security level - when ideal conditions are approached.

Yessica Saez, Laszlo B. Kish, Robert Mingesz et al.

We classify and analyze bit errors in the current measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution. The error probability decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange period and fixed bandwidth, which is similar to the error probability decay in the voltage measurement mode. We also analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for error removal. In this combination method, the error probability is still an exponential function that decays with the duration of the bit exchange period, but it has superior fidelity to the former schemes.

Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes-Goran Granqvist

Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically-unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.

Yessica Saez, Laszlo B. Kish

A method to quantify the error probability at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange is introduced. The types of errors due to statistical inaccuracies in noise voltage measurements are classified and the error probability is calculated. The most interesting finding is that the error probability decays exponentially with the duration of the time window of single bit exchange. The results indicate that it is feasible to have so small error probabilities of the exchanged bits that error correction algorithms are not required. The results are demonstrated with practical considerations.

Laszlo B. Kish, Chiman Kwan

Weak physical uncloneable function (WPUF) encryption key means that the manufacturer of the hardware can clone the key but anybody else is unable to so that. Strong physical uncloneable function (SPUF) encryption key means that even the manufacturer of the hardware is unable to clone the key. In this paper, first we introduce a "ultra"-strong PUF with intrinsic dynamical randomness, which is not only not cloneable but it also gets renewed to an independent key (with fresh randomness) during each use via the unconditionally secure key exchange. The solution utilizes the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) method for dynamical key renewal and a one-time-pad secure key for the challenge/response process. The secure key is stored in a flash memory on the chip to provide tamper-resistance and non-volatile storage with zero power requirements in standby mode. Simplified PUF keys are shown: a strong PUF utilizing KLJN protocol during the first run and noise-based logic (NBL) hyperspace vector string verification method for the challenge/response during the rest of its life or until it is re-initialized. Finally, the simplest PUF utilizes NBL without KLJN thus it can be cloned by the manufacturer but not by anybody else.

Elias Gonzalez, Laszlo B. Kish, Robert Balog et al.

We introduce a protocol with a reconfigurable filter system to create non-overlapping single loops in the smart power grid for the realization of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise secure key distribution system. The protocol is valid for one-dimensional radial networks (chain-like power line) which are typical of the electricity distribution network between the utility and the customer. The speed of the protocol (the number of steps needed) versus grid size is analyzed. When properly generalized, such a system has the potential to achieve unconditionally secure key distribution over the smart power grid of arbitrary geometrical dimensions.

Laszlo B. Kish

We introduce seven new versions of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) classical physical secure key exchange scheme and a new transient protocol for practically-perfect security. While these practical improvements offer progressively enhanced security and/or speed for the non-ideal conditions, the fundamental physical laws providing the security remain the same. In the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme, Alice and Bob utilize the fact that they exactly know not only their own resistor value but also the stochastic time function of their own noise, which they generate before feeding it into the loop. In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known identical sets of different resistors with a proper, publicly known truth table about the bit-interpretation of their combination. In the "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN) system, by using secure communication with a formerly shared key, Alice and Bob share a proper time-dependent truth table for the bit-interpretation of the resistor situation for each secure bit exchange step during generating the next key. The remaining four KLJN schemes are the combinations of the above protocols to synergically enhance the security properties. These are: the "intelligent-multiple" (iMKLJN), the "intelligent-keyed" (iKKLJN), the "keyed-multiple" (KMKLJN) and the "intelligent-keyed-multiple" (iKMKLJN) KLJN key exchange systems. Finally, we introduce a new transient-protocol offering practically-perfect security without privacy amplification, which is not needed at practical applications but it is shown for the sake of ongoing discussions.